

Message Text

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21

ACTION NEA-07

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SAB-01 SAM-01 /050 W

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R 090800Z AUG 75

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2261

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 847

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLOS, PFOR, IZ, XF

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON U.S. GULF POLICY

REF: BAGHDAD 822

1. GOI IS EXTREMELY SERIOUS ABOUT PURSUING GULF COOPERATION,
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ESTABLISHING SECURE PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF MORMUZ, AND

PERHAPS PROMOTING EVENTUAL SECURITY PACT (REFTEL. FROM BAGHDAD VANTAGE POINT, IT WOULD APPEAR VERY MUCH IN U.S. INTERESTS TO ENCOURAGE BY ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS SUCH COOPERATION EVEN IF IT LEADS TO REGIONAL SECURITY PACT SINCE IT WOULD TIE IRAQ TO IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND SMALLER PRO-WESTERN GULF STATES. SOVIET DIPLOMATS HERE ARE EXTREMELY DISTURBED BY THIS POSSIBILITY AND CLAIM THAT IRAQ GULF POLICY IS DIRECTED AGAINST THEM. IN FACT, I BELIEVE PRINCIPAL MOTIVES BEHIND GOI POLICY ARE SECURE PASSAGE AND EXCLUSION OF ALL OUTSIDE POWERS. HOWEVER, NET EFFECT WOULD APPEAR SIGNIFICANTLY MORE CONTRARY TO SOVIET INTERESTS THAN OUR OWN GIVEN CLOSE U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAQ'S PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS.

2. GOI STILL HAS WAY TO GO IN CONVINCING OTHER LITTORAL STATES (AND USINT) THAT IT DESIRES CONSTRUCTIVE GULF RELATIONSHIPS. KEY INDICATOR, IN MY VIEW, WILL BE GOI WILLINGNESS TO RESOLVE BORDER PROBLEM WITH KUWAIT. IF AND WHEN THIS IS RESOLVED, RECEPTIVITY OF OTHER GULF STATES TO IRAQI STRATEGY MAY GROW.

3. AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT IN HOW FAST AND HOW FAR GULF COOPERATION DEVELOPS WILL BE USG REACTION. ASSUMING THAT WE VIEW GULF GROUPING AS COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS, EVEN IF IT COULD BECOME REGIONAL GROUPING RESPONSIBLE FOR GULF SECURITY, WE MUST BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN ENDORSING IT. IT MUST NOT, FROM GOI VIEWPOINT, TAKE ON FLAVOR OF PRO-WESTERN OR ANTI-SOVIET PACT. IT MUST, AT LEAST IN APPEARANCES, BE INDEPENDENT NON-ALLIGNED GROUPING WHICH TREATS ALL OUTSIDE POWERS THE SAME. THEREFORE, USG COULD BEST ENCOURAGE IT BY SAYING NOTHING PUBLICLY AND PERHAPS EVEN HINTING THAT WE ARE NOT TOTALLY IN FAVOR. IT MIGHT ALSO REQUIRE LOOSENING OF OUR BILATERAL TIES WITH SOME OF SMALLER GULF STATES, PARTICULARLY MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD MEAN EVENTUAL RELINQUISHING OF BASE RIGHTS IN BAHRAIN.

4. INSHORT, EVEN IF IRAQ IS SERIOUS AS NOW BELIEVED, PROGRESS TOWARD TRUE REGIONAL GROUPING WILL ONLY SUCCEED IN IRAQI VIEW TO EXTENT IT NON-ALIGNED AND DIRECTED AGAINST ALL OUTSIDE POWERS. GIVEN OUR ALREADY STRONG BILATERAL TIES WITH OTHER GULF STATES, THE NATURAL ECONOMIC PARTNER-CONFIDENTIAL

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SHIP BETWEEN GULF STATES AND U.S., AND CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF GULF STABILITY, SUCH REGIONAL GROUPING WOULD APPEAR COMPLETELY COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS. FOR SOVIETS, HOWEVER, SUCH A GROUPING COULD MEAN THEIR NEAR TOTAL EXCLUSION FROM GULF AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS APPEAR JUSTIFIED IN THEIR CURRENT FEARS ABOUT WHAT IRAQIS ARE UP TO.

5. GOI PREOCCUPATION WITH ASSURING PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS

OF HORMUZ UNDERSCORED BY ACTING FORMIN HISHAM ASH-SHAWI TO
UK SHADOW FORMIN REGINALD MAULDING, DURING RECENT VISIT.
ASH-SHAWI SAID THEY ARE NOW CLOSED STRAITS BECAUSE THEY ARE
ONLY 22 MILES WIDE. BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAD THOUGHT THEY
CONSIDERABLY EXCEEDED 24 MILES IN WIDTH.
LOWRIE

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